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RESPONSE

Data Institutionalism:
A Reply to Andrew Woods
Zachary D. Clopton
In Against Data Exceptionalism, Andrew Keane Woods explores “one of the
greatest societal and technological shifts in recent years,” 1 which manifests in
the “same old” questions about government power. 2 The global cloud is an
important feature of modern technological life that has significant consequences
for individual privacy, law enforcement, and governance. Yet, as Woods
suggests, the legal challenges presented by the cloud have analogies in age-old
puzzles of public and private international law.
Identifying these connections is a conceptual advance, and this contribution
should not be understated. But the most telling statement in Woods’s excellent
article comes early on: “Showing that the jurisdictional challenges presented by
the global cloud are not conceptually novel does not resolve those
problems . . . .” 3 Data may not be exceptional, and the legal puzzles posed by data
sound in existing notions of jurisdiction and conflict of laws. The problem,
however, is that existing answers to these puzzles are unsatisfying. They are
unsatisfying in that they do not provide clear answers, but instead pose even
more challenging normative questions. And they are unsatisfying because some
consensus answers sit on shaky normative footing. More satisfying answers, I
contend, require attention to institutions, not just laws.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes Woods’s core
conceptual argument: the case against data exceptionalism. This claim has much
going for it, but it does not provide crisp answers to many of the challenging
problems of transnational jurisdiction and conflict of laws. Part II then assesses
what Woods’s thesis tells Congress, the courts, and the executive, and it
highlights the questions that remain contested when applying his insights. Part
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Special thanks to Kevin Clermont and
Rebecca Ingber for their feedback on this essay. All errors are mine.
1. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 739 (2016).
2. Id. at 765.
3. Id. at 735.
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III concludes by identifying some ways in which a sensitive institutional account
can improve upon existing approaches to these important questions.
I.

The Argument

“One of the great regulatory challenges of the Internet era—indeed, one of
today’s most pressing privacy questions—is how to define the limits of
government access to personal data stored in the cloud.” 4 Woods begins his
treatment of this great regulatory challenge by describing the practical and legal
consequences of cloud data. These data present particular challenges because
they frequently produce jurisdictional conflicts among interested states. To
make matters worse, Woods offers reasons to doubt that existing mechanisms
to deal with these conflicts are functioning effectively. 5
Following this clear-eyed descriptive account, Woods turns to his more
pressing task: explaining why we should not treat data as exceptional. Data are
intangible, but so are debts. Data are mobile, but so are patents. Data are divisible
and fungible, but so is money. And so on. 6 Indeed, Woods suggests that data cases
may be less challenging because unlike intangible assets, data have physical
locations. 7 Just ask Apple and the FBI. 8
Having explained why data are not exceptional, Woods examines the
unexceptional doctrines of jurisdiction and conflict of laws that bear on data
questions. He relies on the international law of jurisdiction to define the scope
of substantive law (“prescriptive jurisdiction”) and the reach of courts’ process
(“enforcement jurisdiction”). 9 And he suggests that transnational conflicts over
data look like common questions in the conflict of laws, which may be answered
through Brainerd Currie’s balancing of governmental interests (“interest
analysis”). 10 Because data are not exceptional, these existing doctrines offer a
starting point for resolving the regulatory challenges of the global cloud. 11

4. Id. at 729.
5. Id. at 739-54.
6. See id. at 756-63 (discussing inter alia the intangibility, mobility, divisibility, and

fungibility of data).

7. Id. at 760-63.
8. See, e.g., Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1XZ3tLn (discussing the FBI’s efforts to unlock an
iPhone in the government’s possession).
9. Woods, supra note 1, at 764-73.
10. Id. at 774-80.
11. See id. at 781.
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II. The Solutions?
Assuming that the challenges of cloud data are not so dissimilar from
longstanding issues in transnational law, Part V of Woods’s article asks the next
logical question: “what should be done?” 12 It turns out, however, that asking
what should be done under existing approaches raises more questions than it
answers. 13 And in so doing, this inquiry highlights reasons to be unsatisfied with
the existing approaches upon which Woods’s article relies.
A. Congress
The first recommendation of Woods’s piece is that Congress should apply
notions of prescriptive jurisdiction and interest analysis. 14 Although Congress
is not obligated to follow jurisdictional and conflict of laws doctrines, 15 it might
choose to do so as a matter of policy.
Woods is right to identify Congress as a key institution in managing
jurisdictional issues with respect to data. But calling on Congress to apply
notions of prescriptive jurisdiction and interest analysis is just step one.
Imagine that Congress elects to respect the international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction. This means that legislation must be tied to one of the
internationally recognized bases for jurisdiction. So far, so good. But
international jurisdictional law provides a ceiling, not a floor. 16 Calling for
Congress to voluntarily comply with international jurisdictional law only
begins the conversation about where, beneath that ceiling, the law should reside.
Similarly, Congress could adopt a conflict of laws method, but which one?
Woods prefers interest analysis, but other conflict of laws methodologies are
12. Id. at 781-88.
13. And, as I have argued elsewhere, these data cases serve to highlight the weaknesses that

are present in current doctrine. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality,
Technology, and National Security, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (2016).
14. Woods, supra note 1, at 781-85. The international law of prescriptive jurisdiction
provides the circumstances under which a state may “make its law applicable to the
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things.”
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 401 et seq. Interest analysis is a method
to determine the applicable law championed by Brainerd Currie and the Second
Restatement of Conflicts. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAW 188 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (“[International law] is not, as
sometimes is implied, any . . . limitation of the power of Congress.”).
16. This is not news to Woods. See, e..g., Woods, supra note 1, at 764 ([“States] can regulate
acts taking place on their soil as well as acts that affect their citizens, regardless of the
location of those acts.” (emphasis added)); id. at 769-70 (“‘[A] nation can exercise
enforcement jurisdiction only against persons or entities with a presence or assets
within its territory.’” (quoting Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of the Internet: A
Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 135, 139 (2000)) (emphasis added)).
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regularly practiced in U.S. and foreign jurisdictions. 17 The choice of method
requires a normative judgment about policy tradeoffs. Further, even if we
assume that Congress would do some sort of interest balancing, it is not clear
that Congress should follow interest analysis’s advice for courts. Many conflict
of laws decisions are predicated on the institutional position of courts (as distinct
from legislatures), 18 and it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Congress
should have wider berth in defining the nature and scope of the interests to be
balanced. 19
Woods’s application of his general insights to the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) highlights these challenges. Woods
suggests that Congress should reform ECPA to remove its “blocking statute”
effects. 20 Putting aside the hazy boundary between disrespectable blocking
statutes and legitimate expressions of substantive preferences, there is much to
like in Woods’s proposal. But it must be acknowledged that it depends on
normative priors. Woods writes that “the aim of these [proposed] requirements
is not to dictate as a normative matter how such requests for data ought to be
processed, but rather to design the system to maximize appreciation of state
interests and minimize conflicts.” 21 This, of course, is a normative statement in
itself—it is not a foregone conclusion that the law should “maximize
appreciation of state interests and minimize conflicts.” 22 Moreover, the
proposed four-pronged test is just one conflicts approach to answering these
questions—other conflicts models may select other factors, or may give them
different weights. This approach is only justified if it coheres with background
normative commitments not fully developed herein Woods’s article.
Returning to the general, Woods is correct to suggest that Congress should
balance foreign and domestic interests. And centuries of conflict of laws
thinking may provide Congress with helpful ways to address these issues. But
merely labeling this as a conflicts problem does not actually balance the
17. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An

18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

End and a Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847 (surveying state conflict of laws
methodologies). This is not news to Woods either. He frequently observes that conflicts
doctrine poses multiple answers to the same question. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 1, at
756-57 (noting multiple approaches to situs for intangibles); id. at 777-78 (criticizing
courts unpredictably relying on the “notoriously malleable concept of international
comity”).
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990)
(approaching choice of law in light of a conceptualized bargain among state lawmakers).
Cf. Zachary D. Clopton & P. Bartholomew Quintans, Extraterritoriality and Comparative
Institutional Analysis: A Response to Professor Meyer, 102 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 28 (2013)
(suggesting reasons to give weaker extraterritorial effect to common-law rules than
statutory ones).
Woods, supra note 1, at 781.
Id. at 782.
Id. This goal may be even less important for legislatures than for judges (for whom
minimizing conflicts also has a separation of powers justification). See infra Part III.
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competing interests for ECPA amendments or other related regulatory
challenges. Instead, it poses normative questions that demand normative
theories (and perhaps substantial amounts of empirical data).
B. The Courts
Recognizing that Congress may not rewrite ECPA immediately, Woods’s
second recommendation suggests how courts should resolve disputes regarding
ECPA’s reach. Again, Woods’s institutional diagnosis is spot on. Courts
frequently need to interpret statutes where the intended territorial reach is
unclear. To answer this question, Woods reasonably proposes a three-step
approach applying a presumption against extraterritoriality: (1) does the statute
have extraterritorial reach?; (2) are these data in fact extraterritorial?; and
(3) how should interest analysis affect the decision? 23
Woods makes an important contribution in identifying the proper
questions, but current approaches to each question produce inconclusive
answers. First, even if we accepted that the presumption against
extraterritoriality is the optimal tool of statutory interpretation, different
jurists apply the presumption differently. 24 And, as I have explained elsewhere,
this presumption rests on weak normative footing. 25 Instead of resting on
existing doctrine, perhaps the salience of data cases could spur efforts to reform
this doctrine.
The second question is whether these data should be treated as
extraterritorial. Reasonable minds differ over whether these data are
extraterritorial under the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank. 26 Indeed, that is what the tech companies and government
lawyers are fighting about in these cases. 27 And, again, it is far from clear that
Morrison’s approach to this question is the right one. 28
Third, although Woods’s suggestion that courts apply interest analysis to
federal statutes has intuitive appeal, it stands in marked contrast to the way that
the Supreme Court has answered these questions in recent cases. As Caleb Nelson
23. Woods, supra note 1, at 785-86.
24. Consider the multiple opinions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
25.
26.
27.
28.

(2010), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), especially in light of the
Court’s changing composition.
See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014).
561 U.S. 247, 266-69 (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality only when the
conduct comprising the “focus” of the statute is extraterritorial).
See Woods, supra note 1, at 731-32 (describing litigation).
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655 (2011) (criticizing the indeterminacy of Morrison); Clopton,
Replacing, supra note 25 (same).
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put it, “[w]hen the modern Supreme Court invokes the ‘presumption against
extraterritoriality,’ . . . it does not appear to have current choice-of-law
jurisprudence in mind.” 29 So Woods’s suggestion to apply conflicts law to this
dispute would require a significant departure from current law.
Even assuming that conflict of laws analysis applied, the focus on
reciprocity is a bit startling. 30 For one thing, most U.S. jurisdictions do not apply
reciprocity to foreign judgments, and even in those jurisdictions that do,
reciprocity is not applied to the interpretation of federal statutes or to the reach
of U.S. legal instruments. 31 So at a minimum, this proposal is beginning to look
a little exceptional. Moreover, the decision whether to adopt a reciprocity rule
has many characteristics of classically political issues left to the political
branches. 32 The mere fact that reciprocity exists as a matter of judge-made law
in some jurisdictions does not resolve the political question whether it is the
normatively preferable approach. 33
C. The Executive Branch
Woods’s last two recommendations are that mutual legal assistance (MLA)
procedures should be strengthened and that calls for a global treaty should be
resisted. 34 At the risk of sounding like a broken record, there is a lot to like in
these proposals and in their implicit institutional analysis—the executive branch
must be central in making and executing policy in transnational law
enforcement.
I will add only a brief comment. Although Woods’s proposed MLA reforms
seem facially reasonable, 35 it would be unfair to suggest that they are costless.

29. Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law,

30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 721-22 (2013). Nelson speculates that this reflects the “fragmented”
state of current choice-of-law jurisprudence or the Supreme Court's “distaste for the
content of that jurisprudence.” Id. at 722. Neither sounds good for Woods.
Woods, supra note 1, at 778 (suggesting that a reciprocity rule “could easily be applied to
the context of cloud data”).
See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 1094-1102 (5th ed. 2011).
Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2016).
Woods also suggests that his conflicts analysis is valuable because it can deliver outcomes
that are “the same across service providers.” Woods, supra note 1, at 786. But as noted
above, conflicts doctrine is not uniform. Indeed, interest analysis likely would be less
predictable than clear rules against which parties could negotiate. This is not to suggest
that rules are preferable to standards in this area. See Clopton, Territoriality, supra note
13, at 62-63 (suggesting that standards may be preferable in some cases involving
technology). But arguments for standards rely on more than predictability.
Woods, supra note 1, at 786-88.
See id. at 786-87.
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Each proposed reform creates direct costs and opportunity costs. 36 Devoting
resources to MLA reform means that we are taking resources from another
project, and it is not obvious that MLA is the top priority for limited
government resources. Indeed, given how “straightforward” these proposals
seem, 37 it would not be unreasonable to think that executive actors have
eschewed these reforms because they consciously defined other priorities. For
better or worse, answering these questions of law-enforcement resource
allocation is canonically an executive-branch function.
III. An Institutional Approach
The foregoing review has suggested that even if legislative, judicial, and
executive actors accepted international principles of jurisdiction and conflict of
laws, we should expect to face many unanswered questions calling out for
normative judgments. Organizing this review around the three branches was
intentional. An institutional analysis centered on the separation of powers
informs these normative judgments by suggesting which branches should
answer these questions and how they might go about doing so. 38
First, the separation of powers suggests a division of labor between the work
of courts resolving bilateral disputes and the work of the political branches
making system-wide, polycentric choices. 39 This division reflects
considerations of both institutional authority and institutional capacity. 40 As
applied to questions in Woods’s article, that means we should look to Congress
and the executive branch to define the extraterritorial reach of SCA warrants,
provide reciprocity rules, or invigorate MLA efforts. Or not—the political
branches could exercise their institutional prerogatives to decline these
invitations, and those decisions would reflect normative commitments that are
the product of their institutional judgment. 41
Second, the separation of powers does not imply three hermetically sealed
branches. Particularly given the complex, evolving questions at the intersection
of national security and technology, reforms that promote inter-branch
coordination could be encouraged. 42 This logic favors coordinated approaches
36. See id. Arguably they present tradeoffs with respect to security as well: query whether
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

digitization, increased staff, and transparency increase the risk of unintended
disclosures.
Id. at 787.
Federalism also may have something to say about these proposals, but that is beyond the
scope of this Essay. See Clopton, Judging Foreign States, supra note 32, at _.
Id.
Id.
Notably, the separation of powers does not shut out international law—it just filters its
influence through an institutional analysis. See id.
See Clopton, Territoriality, supra note 13, at 62-63.
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to stored communications and surveillance authorities, and disfavors doctrines
that call for one or more branches to abdicate their role in the separation of
powers. 43 And, again, it calls upon the branches to take up their shared-butdifferentiated responsibilities in keeping with their institutional authorities and
capacities.
Finally, this separation of powers analysis calls back to the initial question
regarding data exceptionalism. Woods is probably correct that many data cases
are not exceptional. However, our separation of powers structure implies that
this is a question ultimately posed to the political branches (within
constitutional limits). So even if data cases should not be exceptional, that does
not mean that Congress cannot pass laws that treat them as such, and it does not
mean that executive officials cannot make decisions about priorities with data
exceptionalism in mind. For better or worse, policy choices have created
countless exceptions in the face of arguments against exceptionalism: foreign
defamation cases are exceptional for judgment recognition; 44 Cuban citizens are
exceptional in immigration; 45 Washington, D.C., is exceptional in the
Constitution; 46 and a single case against the Central Bank of Iran is exceptional
for foreign sovereign immunity. 47
Woods argues ably that policymakers should not elect to create data
exceptions. I hope that they are listening. But this is just the first step in a process
of policymaking that is—and should be—governed by unexceptional
institutional relationships.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2013).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2013).
See U.S. CONST., amend. XXIII.
See 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2013); see generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016)
(describing this statute and confirming its constitutionality).
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